In Venema v. Moser Builders, Inc., 2022 PA Super. 171, 2022 Pa. Super. LEXIS 414, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania (Superior Court) upheld an award of judgment on the pleadings from the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County (Trial Court). The Superior Court found that Pennsylvania’s 12-year Statute of Repose for improvements to real property (Statute of Repose) began to run upon the issuance of the certificate of occupancy following original construction of the home in 2003—not from the completion of repairs to the home that continued through 2008. Continue reading
In Progressive Southeastern Ins. Co. v. B&T Bulk, LLC, No. 21S-CT-496, 2022 Ind. LEXIS 131, the Supreme Court of Indiana (Supreme Court) reversed a decision of the Court of Appeals of Indiana (Court of Appeals), ruling that Form MCS-90 (MSC-90) endorsements on insurance policies do not apply to purely intrastate trips. In reversing the decision of the Court of Appeals, the court found that the Indiana Legislature’s incorporation of the federal Motor Carrier Act of 1980 (MCA) into the state code did not expand the MCA’s scope to include intrastate trips. Continue reading
The Supreme Court of Utah recently found that an incorrect pre-construction geotechnical engineering report is a “defective design.” Thus, actions arising from an incorrect geotechnical report are appropriately governed by Utah’s Economic Loss Statute (Statute), Utah Code Ann. § 78B-4-513(1). Continue reading
Pursuant to the Sutton Doctrine, first announced in Sutton v. Jondahl, 532 P.2d 478 (Okla. Ct. App. 1975), some jurisdictions consider a tenant a coinsured of its landlord absent an express agreement to the contrary. In Ro v. Factory Mut. Ins. Co., No. 2019-0620, 2021 N.H. LEXIS 34 (Mar. 10, 2021), the Supreme Court of New Hampshire held that the Sutton Doctrine, adopted by New Hampshire in Cambridge Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Crete, 846 A.2d 521 (N.H. 2004), extends to resident students in a college dormitory. Thus, absent specific language to the contrary, a student is an implied coinsured under the fire insurance policy issued for his or her dormitory. Continue reading
In D’Allesandro v. Lennar Hingham Holdings, LLC, 486 Mass 150, 2020 Mass. LEXIS 721, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts answered a certified question regarding how to apply the Massachusetts statute of repose, Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 260, § 2B, in regards to phased construction projects. The court held that, in this context, the completion of each individual “improvement” to its intended use, or the substantial completion of the individual building and the taking of possession for occupancy by the owner or owners, triggers the statute of repose with respect to the common areas and limited common areas of that building. Additionally, the court held that where a particular improvement is integral to, and intended to serve, multiple buildings (or the development as a whole), the statute of repose is triggered when the discrete improvement is substantially complete and open to its intended use.
In Schueler v. Ad Art, No. 75688-COA, 2020 Nev. App. LEXIS 6, the Court of Appeals of Nevada recently considered whether a custom-made sign constituted a “product” for purposes of the doctrine of strict products liability. The court held that the sign –– a large MGM Grand (MGM) sign located atop a 150-foot tall steel pylon –– was a product for the purposes of strict products liability. Thus, the court held that Ad Art, Inc. (Ad Art), who designed, engineered, and managed the production and installation of the sign, could be held strictly liable for injuries to Charles Schueler (Schueler), a service worker who fell and sustained serious injuries. Continue reading
In D’Allesandro v. Lennar Hingham Holdings, LLC, C.A. No. 17-cv-12567-IT, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 185874, the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts recently discussed a case against a general contractor and its related entities, all of whom were involved in the construction of a multi-phase construction project. The court held that, in this context, completion of the “improvement” – which was the whole project, rather than each individual phase – triggered the six-year statute of repose. The court also held that the plaintiffs’ misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary duty and unfair business practices claims were not claims based on the design and construction of the improvement and, thus, were not subject to the statute of repose.