Author Archives: Lian Skaf

Time

Washington Court Tunnels Deeper Into the Discovery Rule


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Often times, properly analyzing when a statute of limitations begins to run – not just how long it runs – is crucial to timely pleading. In Dep’t of Transp. v. Seattle Tunnel Partners, 2019 Wash.App. LEXIS 281 (Was. Ct. App. Feb. 5, 2019), Division Two of the Court of Appeals of Washington addressed when the discovery rule starts the statute of limitations clock on a negligence cause of action. The court held that the statute of limitations begins to run when the plaintiff knows that the factual elements of the claim against the defendant exist. The clock starts to run even if the plaintiff wants to investigate the possibility of other contributing factors or the defendant identifies opposing viewpoints on the theory of the claim. Continue reading

This entry was posted in Statute of Limitations-Repose, Uncategorized, Washington and tagged , .
Pointing out a Problem

Minnesota “Fryes” the Difference Between Novel Scientific Theory and Novel Science


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In re 3M Bair Hugger Litig., 2019 Minn. App. LEXIS 11, the Minnesota Court of Appeals analyzed the applicable standard for determining whether or not expert opinion testimony based on a novel scientific theory is admissible. Using the Frye-Mack standard, the court reinforced that if an expert opinion involves a novel scientific theory, the underlying evidence used to formulate that theory must be generally accepted in the relevant scientific community. The court further articulated the standard by confirming that, pursuant to Minn. R. Evid. 702, the Frye-Mack applies to novel scientific theory, not novel science. Once the standard is deemed applicable, the court must find the novel scientific theory to be generally accepted in the scientific community to admit the expert’s testimony. Although 3M does not discuss subrogation matters, its analysis should apply with equal force to opinions offered by experts in subrogation cases. Continue reading

This entry was posted in Evidence, Experts – Daubert, Minnesota and tagged , .
Gavel

California Court of Appeals Holds Subrogating Carrier Cannot Assert Claims of Its Suspended Insured


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In Travelers Prop. Cas. Co. of Am. v. Engel Insulation, Inc., 29 Cal. App. 5th 830 (2018), the Third District Court of Appeals of California addressed whether a subrogating carrier can assert the rights of its corporate insured while the insured is suspended and thus barred from doing so itself. The court rejected the argument that Cal. Rev & Tax Code § 19719(b) (1998), which exempts subrogating carriers from the penalties for asserting the rights of a suspended corporation set forth in its own subsection (a), eliminated the prohibition against carriers bringing an action based on the subrogation rights of its suspended insured. Because Travelers’ claims were based solely on its derivative rights of subrogation and its corporate insured was suspended, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s ruling that Travelers had no right to bring its suit. The court’s holding reaffirms California case law that denies subrogating carriers any rights greater than those of their insureds. See Truck Ins. Exch. v. Superior Court, 60 Cal. App. 4th 342 (1997). Continue reading

This entry was posted in California, Parties, Subrogation and tagged .
Gavel

Florida Court of Appeals Holds Underlying Tort Case Must Resolve Before Third-Party Spoliation Action Can Be Litigated


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In Amerisure Ins. Co. v. Rodriguez, 43 Fla. L. Weekly 2225 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App., Sept. 26, 2018), the Third District Court of Appeals of Florida addressed whether a third-party spoliation claim should be litigated and tried at the same time as the plaintiff’s underlying tort case. The court held that since the third-party spoliation claim did not accrue until the underlying claim was resolved, the spoliation cause of action could not proceed until the plaintiff resolved his underlying claim. Continue reading

This entry was posted in Evidence, Florida, Spoliation and tagged , .
Water Loss

Rhode Island District Court Dismisses Plaintiff’s Case for Spoliation Due to Potential Unfair Prejudice to Defendant


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In Amica Mutual Ins. Co. v. BrassCraft Mfg., Co., 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88986 (D.R.I. May 29, 2018), the United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island addressed the question of whether the defendant was so unfairly prejudiced by the subrogating insurer’s spoliation of evidence that dismissal of the plaintiff’s case was the appropriate Rule 37(b)(2)(a)(i)-(vi) sanction. The court, focusing on the potential for undue prejudice to the defendant, granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss. Continue reading

This entry was posted in Rhode Island, Spoliation and tagged , .
Water Loss

Supreme Court of Idaho Rules That Substantial Compliance With the Notice and Opportunity to Repair Act Suffices to Bring Suit


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In Davison v. Debest Plumbing, Inc., 416 P.3d 943 (Ida. 2018), the Supreme Court of Idaho addressed the issue of whether plaintiffs who provided actual notice of a defective condition, but not written notice as stated in the Notice and Opportunity to Repair Act (NORA), Idaho Code §§ 6-2501 to 6-2504, et. seq., substantially complied with the act and if the plaintiffs’ notice was sufficient to bring suit. Section 6-2503 of the NORA states that, “[p]rior to commencing an action against a construction professional for a construction defect, the claimant shall serve written notice of claim on the construction professional. The notice of claim shall state that the claimant asserts a construction defect claim against the construction professional and shall describe the claim in reasonable detail sufficient to determine the general nature of the defect.” Any action not complying with this requirement should be dismissed without prejudice. The court held that the defendant’s actual notice of the defect was sufficient to satisfy the objectives of the NORA and, thus, the plaintiffs’ action complied with the NORA. Continue reading

This entry was posted in Construction Defects, Idaho, Right to Repair Act and tagged , .
Time

Texas Court of Appeals Confirms That, in Order to “Bring Suit” Within the Statute of Limitations Period, a Plaintiff Must Exercise Due Diligence to Serve the Complaint


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In Molina v. Gears, 2018 Tex. App. LEXIS 1978 (March 20, 2018), the Texas Court of Appeals addressed the issue of whether a plaintiff who timely-filed a complaint exercised due diligence with respect to serving the complaint. The court held that, to “bring suit” within a statute of limitations period, a plaintiff must file the complaint within the statutory timeframe and use due diligence to serve the defendant with process. Continue reading

This entry was posted in Statute of Limitations-Repose, Texas and tagged , .

Supreme Court of Virginia Holds that Intentional Spoliation of Evidence is Required for an Adverse Inference Jury Instruction


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In Emerald Point, LLC, et al. v. Hawkins, et al., 808 S.E.2d 384 (Va. 2017), the Supreme Court of Virginia considered whether a trial judge’s adverse inference instruction regarding the spoliation of evidence was warranted when there was no indication that the defendant destroyed the evidence at issue with the deliberate intent to deprive the plaintiff of a fair opportunity to use it in pending or reasonably foreseeable litigation between the parties. Continue reading

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House Bill Clarifies Start Point for Florida’s Statute of Repose


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The Florida legislature recently enacted a law clarifying when the ten-year statute of repose begins to run for cases involving “improvements to real property,” as that phrase is used in Florida Statute Section 95.11. House Bill 377 was signed into law on June 14, 2017 and took effect in all cases accruing on or after July 1, 2017. This amendment is significant to subrogation professionals evaluating when cases involving contractors and design professionals are time barred.

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In Ohio, When a Subrogating Insurer is the Plaintiff, Defendants Should not File Contribution or Indemnification Claims Against the Insured


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For subrogation professionals, it is important to limit the liability exposure of your insured. In cases where the insurer, as subrogee, is proceeding as the plaintiff, this means limiting any direct claims against the insured – whether for contribution or indemnity – to affirmative defenses as opposed to third-party claims. Limiting direct claims against insureds not only keeps captions clean, but avoids strategic maneuvering by the defense that could negatively impact your case. In Ohio, when a defendant tries to pursue direct claims against the insured for contribution or indemnification, practitioners should, consistent with the analysis set forth in Continental Casualty Company v. Equity Indus. Maple Heights, LLC, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54440 (N.D. Ohio, April 10, 2017), argue that defendants can no longer attempt this maneuver and that they are limited to raising affirmative defenses against the plaintiff’s subrogor.

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This entry was posted in Anti-Subrogation Rule, Contribution-Apportionment, Indemnification, Ohio, Subrogation and tagged , , , .