For subrogation professionals, it is important to limit the liability exposure of your insured. In cases where the insurer, as subrogee, is proceeding as the plaintiff, this means limiting any direct claims against the insured – whether for contribution or indemnity – to affirmative defenses as opposed to third-party claims. Limiting direct claims against insureds not only keeps captions clean, but avoids strategic maneuvering by the defense that could negatively impact your case. In Ohio, when a defendant tries to pursue direct claims against the insured for contribution or indemnification, practitioners should, consistent with the analysis set forth in Continental Casualty Company v. Equity Indus. Maple Heights, LLC, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54440 (N.D. Ohio, April 10, 2017), argue that defendants can no longer attempt this maneuver and that they are limited to raising affirmative defenses against the plaintiff’s subrogor.
Author Archives: Lian Skaf
New York Appeals Court Rekindles the Spark
In John Trimble, et al. v. City of Albany, et al., 2016, 144 A.D.3d 1484; 42 N.Y.S. 3d 432 (N.Y. App. Div.), the Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Division, addressed the issue of governmental immunity for municipal fire companies. The court held that the plaintiff, John Trimble (Trimble), had sufficient evidence related to the four-pronged test for establishing a “special relationship” between a municipality and a citizen for liability to attach. In addition, the court held that the defendants were not entitled to summary judgment on the issue of governmental immunity. Specifically, regarding the latter holding, the court stated that, when there is no actual choice made on the part of the government, the government’s actions cannot be considered discretionary and immunity will not apply.
In New Mexico, There Can be More Than One Statute of Repose Accrual Date on Construction Projects
In Damon v. Vista Del Norta Dev., LLC, — P.3d –, 2016-NMCA-083, 2016 N.M. App. Lexis 52 (N.M. Ct. App.), the Court of Appeals of New Mexico addressed the trigger date for the ten-year statute of repose for a physical improvement of real property. Adopting a nuanced approach to interpreting the statute’s three-prong trigger test, the court made it clear that the type of “improvement” at issue is specific to each defendant. Thus, there can be separate statute of repose accrual dates for each different defendant.