In Kohler Co. v. Superior Court, 29 Cal. App. 5th 55 (2018), the Second District of the Court of Appeal of California considered whether the lower court properly allowed homeowners to bring class action claims under the Right to Repair Act (the Act) against a manufacturer of a plumbing fixture for alleged defects in the product. After an extensive analysis of the language of the Act, the court found that class action claims under the Act are not allowed if the product was completely manufactured offsite. Since the subject fixture was completely manufactured offsite, the Court of Appeal reversed the lower court’s decision. The court’s holding establishes that rights and remedies set forth in the Right to Repair Act are not available for class action claims alleging defects in products completely manufactured offsite. Continue reading
In Gindel v. Centex Homes, 2018 Fla.App. LEXIS 13019, Florida’s Fourth District Court of Appeal recently concluded that the date on which the plaintiffs provided a pre-suit notice in compliance with §558.004 of Florida’s construction defect Right-to-Cure statute, Fla. Stat. §§ 558.001 to 558.005, et. seq., is the date on which the plaintiff commenced a “civil action or proceeding,” i.e. an “action,” within the meaning of Florida’s construction defect statute of repose, Florida Statue § 95.11(3)(c). Thus, reversing the decision of the trial court, the Fourth District held that the plaintiffs timely-filed their construction defect action against the defendants. Continue reading
In Davison v. Debest Plumbing, Inc., 416 P.3d 943 (Ida. 2018), the Supreme Court of Idaho addressed the issue of whether plaintiffs who provided actual notice of a defective condition, but not written notice as stated in the Notice and Opportunity to Repair Act (NORA), Idaho Code §§ 6-2501 to 6-2504, et. seq., substantially complied with the act and if the plaintiffs’ notice was sufficient to bring suit. Section 6-2503 of the NORA states that, “[p]rior to commencing an action against a construction professional for a construction defect, the claimant shall serve written notice of claim on the construction professional. The notice of claim shall state that the claimant asserts a construction defect claim against the construction professional and shall describe the claim in reasonable detail sufficient to determine the general nature of the defect.” Any action not complying with this requirement should be dismissed without prejudice. The court held that the defendant’s actual notice of the defect was sufficient to satisfy the objectives of the NORA and, thus, the plaintiffs’ action complied with the NORA. Continue reading
In McMillin Albany LLC v. Superior Court, 2018 Cal. LEXIS 211 (Jan. 18, 2018), the Supreme Court of California addressed the question of whether California’s Right to Repair Act (Act), Civ. Code §§ 895-945.5, applies to claims where the plaintiff alleges that construction defects caused property damage. The court held that the Act – which applies to original construction intended to be sold as an individual dwelling unit – supplanted common law negligence and strict liability actions with a statutory claim under the Act. Thus, where the Act applies, the Act provides the exclusive remedy for plaintiffs seeking to recover for property damages arising from construction defects. Continue reading
There has been a growing trend among states to enact statutes that impose specific notice requirements when bringing claims against construction professionals. These notice requirements may apply to the subrogated carrier bringing a claim against a construction professional for certain types of damages. Failure to comply with the notice requirements can result in a dismissal of the subrogation action. Accordingly, caution must be exercised when notifying construction professionals of certain claims, and not just claims for construction defects.
Many states, including Texas, have Right to Repair statutes that require homeowners to provide notice and an opportunity to repair construction defects to home builders, including contractors who build condominiums. See, e.g. Tex. Prop. Code §§ 27.001 to 27.007. With respect to condominium-related construction defect claims, Texas recently adopted additional procedural requirements that a condominium association with eight or more units must comply with “before filing suit or initiating an arbitration proceeding to resolve a claim pertaining to the construction or design of a unit or the common elements” of a condominium. See Tex. Prop. Code § 82.119 (eff. Sept. 1, 2015). Prior to filing suit or initiating an arbitration proceeding, condominium associations subject to § 82.119 must, among other things:
Florida’s general assembly made changes to Florida’s construction defect notice statute, Fl. St. §§ 558.001 to 558.005, et. seq., that take effect on October 1, 2015.
Florida’s construction defect notice statute is an attempt to put in place an effective alternative dispute resolution mechanism for certain construction defect matters that involves, among other things, the claimant filing a notice of claim with the “contractor, subcontractor, supplier, or design professional that the claimant asserts is responsible for the defect.” Fl. St. § 558.001. The revised statute includes an intent to provide contractors, and insurers, among others, with an opportunity to resolve certain construction defect claims through confidential settlement negotiations, without resort to further legal process. Id. The revised statute does not, however, include a requirement that claimants provide notice of a claim directly to insurers.
In Belasco v. Wells, 183 Cal. Rptr.3d 840, 234 Cal. App. 4th 409 (2015), the California Court of Appeals for the Second District addressed the question of whether a homeowner, when settling an administrative complaint against a licensed homebuilder, can release future, unknown claims. Despite the presence of a California statute, Cal. Civ. Code § 1542, stating that a general release does not extend to claims that the releasor does not know about, the court held that the homeowner’s express release of future claims was enforceable. Thus, the homeowner’s release – signed as part of a 2006 settlement of the homeowner’s construction defect claims against the defendant, a homebuilder – barred the homeowner’s 2012 claims against the builder based on latent defects in the roof of the home that the homeowner discovered in 2011.
In KB Home Greater Los Angeles, Inc. v. Superior Court (Allstate Ins. Co.), 168 Cal. Rptr. 3d 142 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014), the California Court of Appeal addressed the question of whether a subrogating insurer’s failure to comply with the pre-litigation procedures of the California Right to Repair Act (Cal. Civ. Code § 895 et seq.) (the Act) – which require that a homeowner give a builder notice and an opportunity to repair alleged defects – barred the insurer’s claim under the Act. The Court of Appeal held that the insurer’s failure to comply with the pre-litigation procedures of the Act prior to repairing the insured’s home barred the insurer’s cause of action under the statute.
In KB Home, Dipak Roy (Roy), the insured, bought a home from builder KB Home in 2004. Roy’s purchase agreement with KB Home contained a right to repair addendum that advised Roy of the pre-litigation procedures of the Act and directed that notices of defect claims be sent to KB Home’s corporate address in Los Angeles. The limited warranty section of the agreement provided for telephone notice in cases of emergency, followed by a promptly submitted written warranty claim.
In March 2010, Roy’s property manager discovered a water leak in the home, which was vacant at the time. The property manager shut off the water service to the home and called Roy, who, in turn, called his insurer, Allstate Insurance Company (Allstate). Allstate hired a mitigation company to remove excess water, damaged dry wall, and carpet. Allstate inspected the home in April 2010 and completed repairs in June 2010. In July 2010, Allstate sent KB Home a notice of its intent to pursue subrogation claims arising from the water leak. Allstate sent the notice to an address in Irvine, not to KB Home’s corporate address in Los Angeles. In November 2010, however, Allstate’s counsel sent a settlement demand to KB Home’s Los Angeles address. KB Home did not respond to Allstate’s demand.
In March 2011, Allstate filed a subrogation complaint against KB Home. In March 2012, Allstate filed a second amended complaint that alleged causes of action for negligence, strict liability, breach of implied warranty, and violation of the Act. KB Home demurred and the trial court overruled the demurrer, reasoning that the Act did not apply to subrogation claims. On KB Home’s petition, the Court of Appeal issued an alternative writ, directing the trial court to sustain the demurrer as to the negligence and strict liability claims, and to overrule the cause of action under the Act.
After the matter was sent back to the trial court, KB Home filed a motion for summary judgment against Allstate, arguing that it was not given timely notice and an opportunity to repair the defect. Allstate filed a cross-motion for summary judgment, arguing, among other things, that the Act did not require that notice be given to builders before repairs are made and that Allstate complied with the statute’s notice requirements. The trial court denied KB Home’s motion for summary judgment, finding that Allstate’s July and November 2010 letters to KB Home substantially complied with the notice requirements of the Act, and that KB Home forfeited its right to repair when it failed to respond to those letters. In addition, the trial court granted Allstate’s motion for summary judgment, finding that KB Home violated the building standards of the Act. Upon KB Home’s petition, the Court of Appeal issued an alternative writ of mandate, directing the trial court to grant KB Home’s motion for summary judgment and to deny Allstate’s cross-motion for summary judgment. Instead, the trial court upheld the rulings and returned the matter to the appellate court.
Upon return, the Court of Appeal addressed the issue of whether the Act – which applies to the original construction of individual homes sold after January 1, 2003 – requires that notice be given to a builder before repairs are made to a home. Pursuant to Chapter 4 of the Act, a homeowner is required to provide written notice to the original builder of a violation of any of the building standards identified in the statute. Although Allstate argued that the Act does not expressly require that builders be given notice of a defect before repairs are made, the Court of Appeal rejected Allstate’s argument because the pre-litigation procedures in the Act are sequential, and designed to give a builder the opportunity to resolve a homeowner’s construction defect claim “in an expeditious and nonadversarial manner.” As such, completing repairs before providing notice defeats the purpose of the pre-litigation procedures by prohibiting a builder from inspecting the alleged defect and making an offer to repair. The Court of Appeal also found that Allstate’s notice to KB Home did not substantially comply with the Act’s requirements because Allstate gave notice to KB Home months after the defect was repaired. Specifically, the appellate court observed that the notice letter merely asserted Allstate’s subrogation rights, made no reference to the Act, and identified a defect that no longer existed at the time. Because the Act required that Roy, the insured, give KB Home timely notice of the alleged construction defect and KB Home did not receive such notice, Allstate’s subrogation claim under the Act failed.
In analyzing Allstate’s claim, the Court of Appeal also addressed Allstate’s argument that the Act’s notice requirements are not practical when a construction defect causes actual damage, requiring emergency repairs. The appellate court, in dicta, rejected this argument, stating that the Act does not prevent homeowners from seeking immediate redress. Rather, under the Act, a homeowner can comply with the pre-litigation procedures by contacting the builder immediately, through any applicable normal customer service procedures and, then, providing the statutorily required written notice. As stated by the Court of Appeal, because the Act requires the builder to compensate the homeowner for consequential damages, including the cost of repairing actual property damage, the builder has an incentive to act quickly in cases of emergency.
The analysis in KB Home highlights the fact that, when a home is subject to the requirements of the Act, subrogating insurers should comply with the written notice requirements of the Act. In cases of emergency, insurers should contact the builder through its normal customer service procedures and send written notice as required by the Act. Absent compliance with the Act’s notice and opportunity to repair requirements, an insurer’s subrogation claim may be barred.
For more information regarding this alert, please contact Ed Jaeger (215.864.6322 / email@example.com).